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Abstract 
Recent work presents evidence that certain groups of institutional investors are able to 
trade profitably based on private information about earnings and returns.  We contribute to this 
literature in three ways.  First, we test whether certain private information proxies are consistent 
with the creation and liquidation of positions based on private information.  Second, we 
introduce private information proxies that reflect the size and nature of an institution’s position 
in each portfolio firm.  Third, we use a methodology that examines multiple investor 
characteristics simultaneously at the institution-firm-level.  We find that changes in ownership 
by institutions that have large positions in a specific firm are consistent with trading based on 
private information.  However, other previously-documented proxies for private information 
produce results that are more consistent with risk-based trading (e.g., investment style, portfolio 
turnover) or that are insignificant in the presence of the other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type).  We 
also find that informed trading is more prevalent in return-based measures (vs. earnings-based 
measures) and in smaller firms.  Tests for interactions among private information proxies reveal 
that informed trading is most evident when the large positions in firms are newly initiated and 
when they are taken by investment advisers and by large institutions.  Finally, we find that 
institutions following growth strategies exhibit momentum trading in positions held less than one 
year and informed trading in positions held more than one year, suggesting that the information 
advantages to investment styles accrue over time. 
1. Introduction 
 A growing literature suggests that institutional investors are able to execute profitable 
trades based on private information.  These papers find that changes in holdings by institutional 
investors as a whole or specific subgroups (e.g., mutual funds or transient institutions) are 
positively associated with future firm earnings and returns (e.g., Ali et al. [2004], Pinnuck 
[2004], Ke and Petroni [2004], Ke and Ramalingegowda [2005]).  These results are in contrast to 
other literatures that suggest more limited evidence of informed trading by institutions.  For 
example, the mutual fund performance literature suggests that persistence of superior 
performance is not widespread (Jensen [1968], Brown and Goetzmann [1995]).  Moreover, there 
is mixed evidence on informed trading by institutional investors using microstructure data.  
Dennis and Weston [2001] find a negative association between institutional ownership and both 
relative spreads and the probability of informed trading, but a positive association with the 
adverse selection component of the spread.  Finally, prior work shows that institutional investors 
are attracted to firms with richer public information environments, including greater following 
by analysts (O’Brien and Bhushan [1990]) and higher disclosure quality (Bushee and Noe 
[2000]), suggesting less opportunity to obtain an information advantage if public and private 
information are substitutes.  Based on this evidence, it is likely that informed trading by 
institutions, if it exists, is more limited in scope than suggested by the positive associations 
between overall institutional investor trading and future firm performance. 
This paper provides new evidence on the prevalence and sources of informed trading by 
institutions in three ways.  First, drawing on theoretical models of informed trading, we design 
tests to examine whether certain private information proxies are consistent with the creation and 
liquidation of positions based on private information.  Second, we introduce proxies that capture 
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the relation between an institutional investor and a given portfolio firm, such as the length of 
time the firm’s equity has been held and the magnitude of its equity position.  These proxies 
allow the amount of private information to vary both across institutional investor types (as in 
prior work) and within an institutions’ portfolio.  Finally, we use hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) to combine firm-level and institution-firm-level variables in one analysis, allowing us to 
examine multiple institutional investor characteristics simultaneously.     
We find that changes in ownership by institutions that have created a large position in a 
specific firm (both in terms of percent ownership and percent of an institution’s portfolio) are 
consistent with trading based on private information.  Other previously-documented proxies for 
private information produce results that are more consistent with momentum or risk-based 
trading (e.g., investment style, portfolio turnover) or that are insignificant in the presence of the 
other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type).  The clearest evidence of private information trading occurs 
with the return-based performance measures; there is limited evidence of informed trading 
related to earnings-based measures (e.g., analyst forecast errors).  Finally, tests for interactions 
among private information proxies reveal that the length of time a position has been held and 
institution-level characteristics such as investment style and fiduciary type can have a second-
order effect on informed trading; i.e., interactions based on these factors explain additional 
significant differences in the prevalence of informed trading. 
Prior work on informed trading by institutional investors has focused primarily on the 
change in ownership in advance of future performance.  However, there is little evidence 
documenting whether the change in ownership following future performance is also consistent 
with completing the second half of a trading strategy (i.e., cashing out).  Theoretical models 
where investors possess diverse information provide a structure for investigating how investors 
 2
anticipate and react to news releases (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia [1991], [1997]).  Drawing on this 
work, we develop a research design that allows for interpreting evidence of private information 
trading based on the relations between changes in ownership and past, current, and future firm 
performance.  This design recognizes that if informed investors are trading in anticipation of 
future news, such trading should exhibit a positive association with future news and a negative 
association with previously-anticipated current and past news.  Furthermore, we attempt to 
provide a more complete picture of the possible determinants of informed trading by using 
multiple proxies for outcomes which could be predicted using private information, such as 
quarterly and annual returns, analyst forecast errors, and earnings announcement returns. 
While prior work has examined whether large groups of institutions, on average, possess 
private information about all portfolio stocks, we expect that the incidences where an institution 
has private information will be relatively infrequent because of the cost of obtaining private 
information.  We examine a number of private information proxies at both the institution-level 
and the institution-firm-level to provide further insight into whether informed trading by 
institutions is a general phenomenon or is driven by only a small subset of institutional investor 
equity positions in firms.  Following prior work, we test whether institution-specific 
characteristics—such as fiduciary type (e.g., banks, pensions, investment advisors), trading 
strategy (value, growth, transient), and available resources (fund size)—are associated with an 
institutional investor group possessing more precise private information than the average 
investor.  In addition, to identify conditions where a particular institution has private information 
about a particular portfolio firm, we examine the size and duration of an institution’s stake in 
each portfolio firm and an institution’s industry expertise related to each firm.   
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Because there is considerable overlap across these different private information proxies, 
it is difficult to make inferences on a single characteristic without controlling for the other 
characteristics.  To control for this overlap, we employ a HLM framework to examine each 
characteristic’s relative importance for informed trading.  Using this framework, we exploit 
within-firm variation in institutional investor characteristics to estimate the change in ownership 
in a given firm due to a particular characteristic (controlling for all other characteristics).  Then, 
at the firm-level, we regress the sensitivity of changes in ownership to each characteristic on 
prior, current, and future firm performance to determine which private information proxies are 
associated with informed trading. 
First, we estimate a “traditional” firm-level regression of changes in institutional 
ownership aggregated by type on firm performance measures.  This approach provides 
comparability with prior work, but treats each private information proxy separately.  We confirm 
prior findings of institutional trading in advance of future firm performance, including positive 
relations between changes in investment adviser ownership and future earnings-announcement 
returns (Ali et al. [2004], Pinnuck [2004]) and between changes in transient investor ownership 
and future earnings surprises (Ke and Petroni [2004]).  However, while these and other 
institutional investor characteristics, such as growth styles and fund size, are positively related to 
future performance, they are also positively related to past and current performance, contrary to 
what would be expected if these institutions had previously anticipated the current news.  This 
finding suggests momentum or risk-based trading rather than trading to reverse positions taken in 
the past based on private information.  The results most consistent with informed trading are for 
institutions that hold large blocks and take big portfolio bets.  These institutions exhibit both 
trading in advance of future performance and cashing out based on prior and current news.   
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In the HLM estimation, we combine the multiple proxies for private information in one 
analysis.  We find that almost all of the significant relations between the fiduciary type of the 
institution and trading based on current and future performance are rendered insignificant, 
suggesting that fiduciary type is subsumed by other private information proxies.  In contrast, the 
HLM framework provides some evidence that industry expertise is associated with informed 
trading, whereas these relations were insignificant in the aggregated ownership regressions, 
consistent with a suppressor effect that is eliminated when other characteristics are controlled 
for.  The most consistent evidence of private information trading occurs with the return-based 
performance measures.  Other than a positive association between changes in transient institution 
holdings and future analyst forecast errors, there is little evidence of informed trading relative to 
earnings surprises.  Finally, the strongest evidence of private information trading is again found 
among institutions that hold large positions in firms. 
In supplemental analyses, we find that the evidence of informed trading by institutions 
with large positions in firms is concentrated in small firms, as would be expected given the 
relatively rich public information environments of large firms.  In interaction tests, we find that 
private information trading is most evident when large positions in firms are taken by investment 
advisers, which have limited fiduciary responsibilities and lower risk aversion, and by large 
institutions, which have greater resources and potentially more access to management.  We also 
find that results consistent with informed trading are only present for large positions held less 
than one year, suggesting that institutions are entering firms based on private information and 
cashing out when that information is realized in price.  Finally, we find that institutions 
following growth strategies exhibit momentum trading in positions held less than one year and 
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informed trading in positions held more than one year, suggesting that the information 
advantages to investment styles accrue over time. 
This paper contributes to the literature by suggesting that informed trading is not as 
widespread as prior literature suggests.  Prior work indicates that large groups of institutions with 
certain characteristics execute informed trades, on average, with respect to future earnings and 
earnings-announcement returns.  By interpreting the coefficients on both current and future 
performance measures and controlling for multiple private information proxies in the same 
analysis, we find that informed trading is concentrated mainly in situations where an institutional 
investor has taken a large position in a firm in advance of future returns.  We find little evidence 
in support of informed trading based on future earnings or earnings-announcement returns.1      
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the hypotheses 
development and related literature.  Section 3 outlines the research design and variable 
measurement.  Section 4 describes the sample selection.  Section 5 presents the empirical results 
and is followed by the conclusion in section 6. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1 Prior research 
 Prior empirical research often examines trading volume around information events for 
evidence that investors possess private information of heterogeneous quality (e.g., Beaver 
[1968]).  Prior work has demonstrated that volume at an earnings announcement is positively 
associated with the dispersion among analysts before an earnings announcement (Ataise and 
Bamber [1994]) and the change in the dispersion in beliefs (Bamber, Barron, and Stober [1997]).  
Trading volume in the earnings announcement window is also sensitive to the prior percentage of 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is that we find evidence that transient investors trade in advance of analysts forecast errors, 
consistent with Ke and Petroni [2004].  
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total institutional ownership (Utama and Cready [1997]) and the prior percentage ownership by 
institutions with a given style (e.g. momentum, growth, high turnover) (Hotchkiss and Strickland 
[2003]).  These findings indicate that institutional investors have differential amounts of private 
information about earnings, both relative to non-institutional investors and across different types 
of institutions.  Such dispersion in private information has also been documented using stock 
returns.  Badrinath and Wahal [2002] find a positive association between changes in ownership 
and lagged returns (momentum trading) that varies by fiduciary type (e.g., bank) and investment 
style (e.g., value/growth).   
Prior work also examines whether institutional investors trade in a manner that predicts 
upcoming earnings news or returns.  The presence of institutional investors is positively related 
to the extent that prices lead earnings, consistent with institutions making trades that impound 
information about future earnings in stock prices (Jiambalvo, et al. [2002]; Piotroski and 
Roulstone [2003]).  Ke and Petroni [2004] find that transient investors (i.e., institutions that own 
small stakes and trade frequently) sell firms in the two quarters prior to a break in a sequence of 
positive earnings increases.  Ke and Ramalingegowda [2005] find that transient institutions 
possess private information on long-term earnings that will be reflected in near-term stock prices 
(e.g., six months ahead) but do not have private information on long-term earnings that will be 
reflected in long-term stock prices.  They also find that transient institutions can earn abnormal 
returns in excess of 10% on their private information.  Ali, et al. [2004] documents that large 
changes in total institutional ownership precede abnormal returns around the next earnings 
announcement.  Pinnuck [2004] finds that Australian mutual funds rebalance their holdings in 
anticipation of future returns based on earnings news.  The latter three studies suggest that 
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institutions not only have private information about upcoming earnings, but that they are able to 
profit from it as well.       
We address a number of the limitations of these prior studies.2  First, the prior literature is 
mixed on whether the best test of informed trading should involve past, current, or future 
information.  While many studies control for information in multiple periods to remove the 
effects of post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas [1990]) or price momentum 
(Jagedessh and Titman [1993]), the coefficients on only the future period are generally 
considered as evidence on informed trading.  We draw on existing theory to provide an empirical 
framework in which trading related to both current and future firm performance provides 
evidence on informed trading.  Second, the prior literature generally uses fixed institutional 
investor characteristics as proxies for private information and examines levels or changes in 
holdings aggregated by each characteristic.  We expect that institutions are likely to have private 
information in only certain portfolio firms and, thus, we introduce proxies that capture the 
characteristics of an institution’s investment in each portfolio firm.  We also use a methodology 
that examines multiple investor characteristics at the institution-firm-level, allowing tests of 
whether any previously-documented private information proxies are subsumed by other proxies. 
 
2.2 The precision of private information and informed trading 
We draw on the model of Kim and Verrecchia [1997] (KV) to develop predictions for the 
relations between informed trading by institutions and both current and future news.  KV 
                                                 
2  Because the data on specific institution holdings in the US is only available quarterly, there have been two 
approaches to testing for private information trading: (1) association tests between short-window volume/returns and 
the level of institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter and (2) association tests between changes in 
quarterly holdings and short- or long-window returns and earnings.  The drawback to the first approach is that the 
test is unsigned (i.e., it cannot be determined whether a specific institution bought or sold in a specific window) and 
the drawback to the second is that quarterly changes in holdings mask the timing of intra-quarter changes.  We adopt 
the second approach in this paper because the sign of the change in holdings is important, and we provide evidence 
on various earnings and returns windows to partially mitigate the second drawback. 
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articulates the relation between investor trades and the precision of two different types of private 
information: predicting the content of an announcement (“pre-announcement information”) and 
interpreting the content of an announcement (“event-period information”).  In a noisy rational 
expectations equilibrium with a single information announcement, they derive the change in an 
investor’s demand after an announcement (D2i – D1i) as a function of the relative precision of 
that investor’s private information before (s1i – s1) and after (s2i - s2) the announcement, the 
returns preceding and following the announcement, and the investor’s risk tolerance (ri): 
D2i – D1i = ri[s2iε2i + (s1i – s1)(P1 – P2) + (s2i – s2)(u – P2) ] (1) 
   
 where Dti = demand for investor i at time t;  
ri = coefficient of risk tolerance for investor i;  
sti = the precision of investor i’s private information at time t;  
st = the average (or market’s) precision of private information at time t;  
Pt = price at time t;  
u = the liquidating dividend;  
ε2i = error in investor i’s private assessment of firm value  
 
In this model, traders with more precise private information about the value of the firm 
before an announcement (s1i – s1) take positions in the stock before news is released.  These 
traders anticipate the announcement and, thus, learn less from the disclosure and price change; 
their changes in ownership are negatively related to the returns leading up to the announcement.  
This negative association can also be interpreted as institutions “cashing out” the profits from 
previous trades based on private information.  Traders that are unable to anticipate the 
announcement will exhibit changes in ownership that are positively correlated with the 
concurrent price movement, which is indicative of learning from the announcement.  Thus, we 
expect to see a negative relation between investor trading and current returns for those investors 
that had private information prior to the news release. 
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Unlike the ability to anticipate news, the ability to interpret news does not influence the 
demand choice before the announcement occurs.  However, the ability to interpret information 
released during a particular window will alter the trades of an institution during that window.  
Investors that have an advantage in interpreting a signal (s2i - s2) will make trades that are 
positively associated with increases in future firm value following the announcement.  Traders at 
a disadvantage in interpreting the signal will exhibit a negative relation between their trading and 
future returns.  Thus, we expect a positive relation between investor trading and future returns 
for those investors that had more precise information based on their ability to interpret new 
information disclosed during the period. 
In the empirical tests, we examine quarterly cross-sectional data that is not tied to a 
specific announcement, which is a significant deviation from the KV model.  Consequently, one 
quarter’s private event-period information will manifest as private pre-announcement 
information in the subsequent quarter.  Thus, it is difficult to disentangle informed trading based 
on nonpublic private information obtained prior to a quarter from trading based on a more 
precise interpretation of public disclosure.  However, for the purposes of our tests, the source of 
the information advantage is not important.  Either type of information advantage should result 
in the same empirical findings: a negative (positive) association between current (future) news. 
 
2.3 The precision of private information and observable investor characteristics 
To incorporate the role of private information proxies, we make the following 
modifications to equation (1).  First, we distribute the risk tolerance parameter across the terms, 
rewrite the current returns in the usual (P2 – P1) form, and add firm-level subscripts (j) to 
highlight the fact that this equation will be estimated in a cross-section of firms: 
∆D2ij  = ris2ijε2ij – ri(s1ij – s1j) ∆P2j + ri(s2ij – s2j) ∆P3j (2) 
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 where ∆D2ij = D2ij – D1ij;  ∆P2j = P2j – P1j; and ∆P3j  = uj – P2j  
 
Equation (2) shows that risk aversion could offset any advantage of superior private information.  
Thus, the absence of evidence in favor of informed trading could suggest a lack of private 
information or lower risk tolerance.   
We include a number of possible proxies for private information.  For simplicity, we only 
include two proxies in the following equation, one at the institution-firm-level (X1ij) and one at 
the institution-level (X2i).  Both of these proxies are hypothesized to map into ri(stij – stj) in a 
linear way where the intercept term (aj) is allowed to vary across firms.3   
ri(s1ij – s1j) = a1j + b1 X1ij + b2 X2i  (3) 
ri(s2ij – s2j) = a2j + b3 X1ij + b4 X2i  (4) 
   
 where X1ij = Private information proxy for institution i in firm j;  
X2i = Private information proxy for institution i;  
a, b = Linear weights  
 
Now, we substitute equations (3) and (4) into equation (2): 
 
∆D2ij  = [a2j + b3 X1ij + b4 X2i  + ris2j]ε2ij – [a1j + b1 X1ij + b2 X2i ] ∆P2j +  
        [a2j + b3 X1ij + b4 X2i ] ∆P3j 
(5) 
 
Rearranging equation (5) and substituting regression parameters for the theoretical constructs 
leads to our hypothesized relation between changes in individual institutional investor holdings, 
private information proxies, and current and future returns: 
∆D2ij  = αj + [β1X1ij + β2 X2i ] ∆P2j  + [β3 X1ij + β4 X2i ] ∆P3j + νij (6) 
   
 where αj = – a1j∆P2j + a2j∆P3j  (firm fixed effect);  
β1 = -b1;   β2  = -b2;   β3  = b3;   β4  = b4;     
νij = [a2j + b3 X1ij + b4 X2i  + ris2j]ε2ij (error term);  
 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in institutional holdings will be negatively related to 
private information proxies interacted with current returns (i.e., β1 < 0, β2 < 0)  
                                                 
3 The theoretical precision construct is calculated relative to an average for each firm.  The firm-specific intercept 
ensures that the characteristics we examine are also mean zero for each firm. 
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Hypothesis 2: Changes in institutional holdings will be positively related to 
private information proxies interacted with future returns (i.e., β3 > 0, β4 > 0)  
 
Support for both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 would provide strong and consistent 
evidence that informed trading is associated with a given private information proxy.  However, if 
only one of the two hypotheses is supported, care must be exercised in interpreting the results 
because there are other potential explanations.  For example, if a certain proxy represents 
institutions buying riskier firms with higher expected returns, then both β2 and β4 will be 
positive; whereas private information trading should result in only β4 being positive, with β2 
either negative or zero.  As another example, if hypothesis 1 is supported (β2 < 0) but hypothesis 
2 is rejected because β4 is not significantly different from zero, it could either mean that the 
institution is trading based on long-term private information (i.e., we observe the 
anticipation/cash-out but not the trading in advance of short-term future performance) or that the 
institution is following a contrarian strategy of selling winners and buying losers solely based on 
the realized returns.  We will run additional analysis to attempt to disentangle such explanations. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Variable Measurement 
3.1.1 Private information proxies 
 We include a number of possible proxies for private information to represent situations in 
which an institution is more likely to have an information processing advantage, greater 
incentives to incur the costs of information gathering, and/or increased access to management.  
In each case, we create an indicator variable for the private information proxy to facilitate 
interpretation of the interaction terms.  The Appendix presents all variable definitions and a 
timeline of when each variable is measured. 
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Our institutional-investor-level private information proxies include the institution’s 
investment style, its trading behavior, the resources available to produce private information, and 
its fiduciary obligations.  We examine two investment style classifications: VALUE and 
GROWTH.4  We assume that institutions choose to specialize in a specific style rather than hold 
a broad index because these institutions have more expertise than the average investor in valuing 
certain firms.  If this valuation expertise is due to the possession of private information and/or 
the ability to interpret a given firm’s results, we expect that GROWTH and/or VALUE will be 
associated with private information trading.   
We also examine whether trading behavior is associated with incentives to earn short-
term trading profits.  We identify TRANSIENT institutional investors using the classification in 
Bushee [2001], which characterizes transient investors as having high portfolio turnover and 
small stake sizes.  TRANSIENT institutions have strong incentives to gather private information 
because they are engaging in strategies to profit from short-term price appreciation, as opposed 
to dedicated and transient institutions, which follow longer-term buy-and-hold strategies (Bushee 
[2001]).  Ke and Petroni [2004] find that TRANSIENT institutions are more likely to sell a firm 
before it has a break in a long sequence of earnings increases, consistent with their incentives to 
gather short-term private information.  Thus, we expect TRANSIENT to be associated with 
private information trading. 
Next, we use the size of the institutional investor to proxy for resources available to 
gather private information.  We define the variable LARGE to equal one if the market value of 
an institutions’ equity portfolio is in the top quintile for all institutions in a given quarter and 
                                                 
4 These classifications are based on the factor analysis in Abarbanell et al. [2003], which produces a “value” factor 
based on each institution’s portfolio weighted-average earnings-to-price ratio, book-to-price ratio, and dividend 
yield.  We perform a k-means cluster analysis to split institutions into three groups based on the value factor; the top 
(bottom) group of institutions is classified as VALUE (GROWTH) institutions.   
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zero otherwise.  LARGE should proxy for private information if larger institutions have greater 
access to firm management or have better processing capabilities due to economies of scale or a 
larger pool of buy-side analysts.  In addition, LARGE may measure the perceptions of individual 
contributors to the institutions.  If individuals allocate their wealth to institutions based on 
perceived information advantages, then more informed institutions will have more assets under 
management.  Thus, we expect that LARGE will be associated with private information trading.   
Our final institution-level characteristic captures an institution’s fiduciary type.  Because 
the enforcement of fiduciary responsibility centers on the prudence of investment decisions, 
managers of banks and pensions, which face stricter standards under common law and ERISA, 
should behave in a more risk averse manner than managers of mutual funds/investment advisors, 
which are largely absolved from fiduciary responsibility by the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Del Guercio [1996], Abarbanell, et al. [2003]).  We classify institutions into four 
categories: bank trusts (BANK), investment advisors (IIA), pensions and endowments (P&E), 
and insurance companies, as in Abarbanell et al. [2003].  We create indicator variables for the 
first three categories, making insurance companies the omitted group.  While we do not place 
any prediction on these variables with respect to the precision of private information, we expect a 
weaker sensitivity of changes in holdings to different price movements for BANK and P&E due 
to their lower levels of risk tolerance.5  
Our private information proxies that capture the institution’s position in a given firm 
include the percent of total shares outstanding held by the institution, the percent of institution’s 
portfolio concentrated in a given firm, the length of time the firm has been held, and a measure 
of expertise in the firm’s industry.  We define the variable for large holdings in a firm, BLOCK, 
                                                 
5 Ali, et al. [2004] use this classification as a proxy for differences in investment style / trading orientation.  
However, because we have more direct measures of these attributes, we expect that differences in fiduciary type are 
more likely to reflect risk aversion than private information collection. 
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as an indicator variable equal to one if the percent of total shares outstanding held by the 
institution is in the top quintile for the firm and zero otherwise.6  We expect BLOCK to be 
associated with private information trading as large stakeholders generally have more access to 
management and greater incentives to incur the costs of private information acquisition.  
Moreover, the large stake size itself could reflect the fact that the institution believes that it has 
an information advantage in the stock.     
We also define a indicator for large portfolio bets in a given firm, BET, which equals one 
if the percent of the institution’s equity portfolio invested in a firm is in the top quintile for the 
firm and zero otherwise.  BET captures the extent to which an institution is over-weighted in a 
given firm, which again creates stronger incentives to gather private information and likely 
reflects the institution believing that it holds superior information in the firm.  While BET and 
BLOCK are likely to be positively correlated, BET is probably a better measure of incentives to 
gather private information about the firm and BLOCK is a better measure of the institution’s 
access to management. 
Next, we define long-term holdings, LTHELD, as an indicator variable equal to one if the 
institution has held the firm continuously for at least one year and zero otherwise.7  We expect 
LTHELD to be associated with private information trading as it reflects the accumulation of 
firm-specific knowledge over an entire fiscal year, which should aid in interpreting any public 
disclosures, as well as reflecting a potentially closer relationship with management due to the 
institution’s commitment to holding the firm. 
                                                 
6 While blockholder ownership is often defined as 5% or 2% ownership in a given firm, we wanted to define this 
variable such that there were some institutions in all firms that had a value of one for this measure.  It is likely that, 
even in firms with highly disperse holdings, institutions that have larger stake sizes still have greater incentives to 
gather private information in the firm than other investors.  
7 Although we chose the one year benchmark to capture institutions that have held a firm through an entire fiscal 
year, five quarters held is also the median of the distribution of the numbers of quarter held. 
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 Finally, we measure the amount of potential expertise the institution has in a given firm’s 
industry.  We compute the percent of the institution’s portfolio market value that is held in stocks 
in the same two-digit SIC as a given firm (excluding the firm) and define industry expertise, 
INDEXP, as an indicator variable equal to one if the industry holdings are in the top quintile for 
the firm and zero otherwise.  We expect that INDEXP is associated with private information 
trading as it reflects the institution’s ability to use industry-specific information gained in its 
other portfolio holdings to improve its interpretation of firm-specific information. 
 
3.1.2 Performance measures 
In KV, the change in investor holdings occurs around a discrete announcement.  The 
most difficult part of translating this model to an empirical setting involving institutional 
investors is that institutional holdings are only available at the end of each calendar quarter.  We 
measure the change in ownership (∆IH) by a given institution as the difference between the 
percent of total shares outstanding it holds at the beginning and end of the calendar quarter.  
Consequently, we cannot determine whether changes in institutional holdings over a quarter 
happened before, during, or after a news announcement.  Thus, we will also add performance in 
the prior quarter to the specification to get an unambiguous measure of trading after firm 
performance is revealed to the market. 
A second issue in translating the KV model to an empirical test is that their model 
assumes perfect competition among investors or that the changes in investor demands do not 
move prices.  Market microstructure research provides evidence that block trades create price 
movements due to price pressure (Holthausen, et al. [1990]; Chan and Lakonishok [1993], 
[1995]).  Because trades by institutional investors can be large enough to cause some price 
pressure, their private information could be impounded into price in advance of the next news 
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announcement.  In such as case, there could be a negative relation between private information 
trading and price changes around subsequent announcements.  Thus, looking only at returns 
around news announcements could provide a biased picture of informed trading. 
We examine four firm performance measures to test for private information trading.  
First, we examine analyst forecast errors (AFE), defined as actual earnings per share (EPS) 
(according to IBES) minus the last consensus analyst’ forecast of EPS prior to the end of the 
calendar quarter, deflated by the price per share on the forecast date.  Analyst forecast errors will 
not be mechanically affected by institutional trading, as price movements may be.8  Analyst 
forecasts also have the property of providing a proxy for the average level of information in the 
market among sophisticated market participants; whereas price can be potentially biased by 
naïve marginal traders (Hand [1990], Walther [1997]).  The disadvantage of analyst forecast 
errors is that, ultimately, institutions seek price appreciation from their informed trading.  Given 
documented biases in analyst forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy [2004]), their errors do not 
necessarily translate into price reactions.9 
Second, we examine stock returns around the earnings announcement (CAR), defined as 
the three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted return in the window (-2, 0) around the earnings 
announcement.  This measure most directly captures the theoretical construct in KV and has 
been used by prior research to test for private information trading (Ali, et al. [2004], Pinnuck 
[2004]).  As mentioned earlier, this measure has the drawback that the return surprise around 
earnings announcements could be related to the degree of private information trading that has 
                                                 
8 Although, to the extent that analysts use price changes to update their forecasts, there still may be an indirect 
relation between private information trading and subsequent forecast errors 
9 Another potential drawback is that future earnings performance could be a function of institutional ownership if 
corporate managers manipulate earnings based on the institutional investor clienteles (Bushee [1998]). 
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already been impounded in price.  Also, this measure only captures private information trading 
related to short-term earnings news. 
Third, we measure firm performance using quarterly buy-and-hold returns (BHAR3), 
which are computed as the buy-and-hold returns for the stock less the buy-and-hold returns for 
the firm's size decile over the calendar quarter.  This measure captures any returns to informed 
trading that are not realized around earnings announcements.  Finally, we compute buy-and-hold 
returns for the year (BHAR12) subsequent to the calendar quarter of the institutional holdings 
change (we still use BHAR3 as the current and past performance measure in this test).  This 
measure captures any private information trading related to longer-term news. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1 Regressions using firm-level aggregation 
The first approach we adopt to test for private information trading by institutional 
investors involves aggregating institution-firm-level data by firm and estimating a cross-sectional 
firm-level regression.  For example, we aggregate all of the holdings of institutions that have 
held a given firm more than one year (e.g., LTHELD = 1) into a total firm-level ownership 
variable for this group of institutions (IH(LTHELD)).  Then, we regress the change in holdings 
by this group of institutions on the past, current, and future performance measures:10 
∆IH(X)jt  = γ0 + γ1Zjt-1+ γ2Zjt + γ3Zjt+1 + εijt  (7) 
   
 where ∆IH(X)jt = change in ownership by all institutional investors in firm j with private 
information proxy X equal to one; 
 
X = private information proxies:  BANK, P&E, IIA, GROWTH, VALUE, 
TRANSIENT, LARGE, BLOCK, BET, LTHELD, and INDEXP; 
 
Zjt = firm performance measure (AFE, CAR, BHAR3, or BHAR12)  
 
                                                 
10 In computing changes in holdings by group, we use the value of the private information proxies at the beginning 
of the firm performance measurement period (see Appendix) to ensure that changes in holdings are not driven by 
changes in the private information proxy over the period. 
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To mitigate biases due to cross-sectional correlation (Bernard [1987]), we estimate the above 
regression separately for each calendar quarter.  Then, we report the mean coefficients from the 
quarterly regressions and perform significance tests using standard errors computed from the 
distribution of these coefficients (Fama and MacBeth [1973]). 
This methodology is commonly used in prior research and we present results using it to 
enhance comparability.  However, each private information proxy is treated as an independent 
factor, ignoring any possible correlations among factors.  Thus, we adopt a second methodology 
which allows us to include all of the private information proxies in a multivariate framework. 
 
3.2.2 Hierarchical linear modeling  
Our second approach is hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which allows estimation of 
multiple levels of analysis with one model (Raudenbush and Bryk [2002]).  For each firm, 
changes in holdings by individual institutions are regressed on the private information proxies.  
The coefficients from the first stage are then regressed on the firm performance measures to 
determine how much of the sensitivity of changes in holdings to private information proxies is 
related to past, current, and future firm performance.   
To illustrate this methodology, let ∆IHijt represent the change in ownership by 
institutional investor i in firm j at time t, X1ijt represent the vector of institution-firm-level private 
information proxies (LTHELD, BLOCK, BET, INDEXP), X2it represent the vector of 
institutional-level proxies (BANK, P&E, IIA, LARGE, GROWTH, VALUE, TRANSIENT) and 
Zjt represent the firm performance measure (AFE, CAR, BHAR3, BHAR12) at time t relative to 
the change in holdings.  This approach can be represented by the following multi-level model: 
∆IHijt  = αjt + β1jtX1ijt + β2jtX2it + εijt (8a) 
       
αjt = γ00 + γ01Zjt-1+ γ02Zjt + γ03Zjt+1 (8b) 
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β1jt = γ10 + γ11Zjt-1+ γ12Zjt + γ13Zjt+1 (8c) 
β2jt = γ20 + γ21Zjt-1+ γ22Zjt + γ23Zjt+1 (8d) 
 
The beta coefficients in equation (8a) measure how sensitive changes in institutional holdings are 
to the private information proxies.  These coefficients are not meaningful on their own as 
institutional trading is only expected to be systematically related to private information proxies 
in those quarters when the private information calls for a trade.  In such quarters, the beta 
coefficients will be large, and should be associated with the realized firm performance measures.  
Thus, the important coefficients are the gamma coefficients in equations (8c) and (8d).  If these 
coefficients are significant in the predicted direction, it supports the argument that the 
institutional investor trading is sensitive to the private information proxies. 
 The set of equations above can be estimated using separate OLS regressions to yield 
unbiased coefficient estimates and, if the errors are iid, the OLS estimates are the minimum 
variance, unbiased estimators of the parameters (Raudenbush and Bryk [2002]).  However, if the 
sample size or the dispersion in the variables for some firms is small, the OLS coefficients will 
tend to be imprecise due to finite sample bias (Raudenbush and Bryk [2002]).  In such a case, 
substituting the equations (8b, 8c, and 8d) into (8a) yields more accurate estimates: 
∆IHijt  = (γ00 + γ01Zjt-1+ γ02Zjt + γ03Zjt+1) + (γ10 + γ11Zjt-1+ γ12Zjt + γ13Zjt+1)X1ijt  
+ (γ20 + γ21Zjt-1+ γ22Zjt + γ23Zjt+1)X2it + εijt  
(9) 
 
Because equation (9) introduces possible dependence due to repeated firm observations, 
we estimate a model that includes firm-quarter fixed effects.11  After rearranging terms, our final 
regression specification corresponds to equation (5), which we derived from the KV model: 
∆IHijt  = (Firm fixed effect)jt + (γ10X1ijt +γ20X2it) + (γ11X1ijt + γ21X2it)Zjt-1+  
           (γ12X1ijt + γ22X2it)Zjt + (γ13X1ijt + γ23X2it)Zjt+1 + εijt 
(10) 
   
                                                 
11 Since fixed effects models with numerous dummies are computationally intensive, we re-center the data and 
perform OLS to produce comparable results (Greene [2000], p.565). 
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where ∆IHijt = change in ownership by institutional investor i in firm j;  
X1ijt = vector of institution-firm-level private information proxies (LTHELD, 
BLOCK, BET, and INDEXP); 
 
X2it = vector of fixed institutional private information proxies (BANK, P&E, 
IIA, LARGE, GROWTH, VALUE, and TRANSIENT); 
 
Zjt = firm performance measure (AFE, CAR, BHAR3, or BHAR12)  
 
We estimate these regressions by calendar quarter and report the mean coefficients with 
significance tests based on Fama-MacBeth standard errors. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1  Sample  
Our sample period spans the years 1983 to 2004, which the extent of the Thomson 
Financial Spectrum database.12  The Spectrum data is based on the Form 13-F information filed 
with the SEC, which requires institutions managing more than $100 million in equity to file a 
quarterly report with the SEC of all equity holdings greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in 
market value.  We apply the following data requirements in forming our sample.  First, we 
require all institutions to have been listed on Spectrum for at least three years so we can compute 
a reasonable “time held” variable for an institution’s investment in a firm.  Second, we require all 
firms to have at least one year of prior observations on Spectrum to remove any unusual effects 
due to IPO’s.  Third, we require that firms have at least 50 institutional investors in a given 
quarter to ensure there is sufficient cross-sectional variation in individual institution types within 
a firm.  Fourth, we restrict the sample to December fiscal-year-end firms to facilitate matching of 
fiscal quarters to Spectrum calendar quarters.  Finally, we require that Spectrum data can be 
matched to Compustat, for which we collect industry classification and firm size data.  These 
data restrictions result in 11,664,695 institution-firm-quarter observations from Spectrum, which 
represents 82,601 firm-quarters. 
                                                 
12 The data starts in 1980, but we require at least three years of prior data 
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We obtain stock return data from CRSP and analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S.  We 
allow the final sample size to vary by performance measure to maximize the number of 
observations for each test.  We have a small loss of observations for the returns measures due to 
missing return data or missing earnings announcements.  For the analyst forecast tests, we lose 
about 45% of our observations due to firms not covered by I/B/E/S and to the fact that quarterly 
forecasts are not widely available until 1985.  Final sample sizes are provided in Table 1 with the 
descriptive statistics for each performance metric. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 The first row of Table 1 shows that most quarterly changes in individual institutional 
investor holdings tend to be quite small in terms of percent of the total shares outstanding (mean 
and median change is 0.0%, with a standard deviation of 0.2%).  The next set of rows provides 
the change in institutional holdings aggregated to the firm level.  The mean (median) change in 
the percentage ownership for the sum of all institutions is 3.1% (2.5%), consistent with a time-
series increase in institutional ownership over the sample period.  Of the different types of 
institutions, investment advisers, transient institutions, and large institutions tend to have the 
largest changes in ownership, as suggested by the standard deviation. 
 The remainder of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the four performance 
measures: analyst forecast errors (AFE), cumulative abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements (CAR), and buy-and-hold abnormal returns over three and twelve month periods 
(BHAR3 and BHAR12, respectively).13  In the general, the means for the measures are positive, 
but smaller than 1%.  The only exception is that the mean BHAR3 in the prior period is 1.5%, 
                                                 
13 Because of extreme observations, we truncate the top and bottom 1% of all performance measures based on 
distribution from the full Compustat population.  For the price-deflated analyst forecast errors, we also remove 
observations where the absolute value is above 1 before this truncation.  Results are quantitatively similar if we 
windsorize extreme observations instead of truncating and if we do not first remove extreme forecast errors. 
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which is due to the fact that we impose a small selection bias in requiring firms to have prior, 
current, and future period returns. 
 In Table 2, we present descriptive evidence on the associations among the private 
information proxies.  This table reports the percent of each type of institution (in columns) that 
also has a value of 1 for the other private information proxies (in rows).  For example, the first 
column reports the percent of all institutions that are BANK (28.5%), P&E (9.5%), and so forth.  
The first column is also a useful benchmark to determine whether specific types of institutions 
are over- or underrepresented by another private information proxy.  In the rest of the table, we 
present the difference between the percent of institutions of a type that have the other private 
information proxy and the percent for all institutions.  For example, the -8.3% in the BANK 
column for the VALUE row indicates that 19.6% of banks follow a value strategy, which is 8.3 
percentage points lower than the overall frequency of 27.9%. 
Panel A presents the institution-specific characteristics in the columns.  Consistent with 
their fiduciary responsibilities, BANK and P&E institutions tend to follow neither extreme 
GROWTH nor VALUE strategies, have fewer TRANSIENT institutions, more LARGE 
institutions, and fewer BET and INDEXP strategies.  The only difference is that banks have a 
higher percentage of long-term holdings (LTHELD).  In contrast, IIA tend to have more 
GROWTH and VALUE strategies, more TRANSIENT institutions, fewer LARGE and LTHELD 
institutions, and more BLOCK, BET, and INDEXP strategies.  VALUE and GROWTH 
institutions are more likely to be TRANSIENT (and vice versa), and all three types are less likely 
to have LTHELD equal to one.  LARGE institutions are more likely to have BLOCK and 
LTHELD strategies, and less likely to make big portfolio bets. 
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Panel B presents the institution-firm-level characteristics in columns.  BLOCK, BET, and 
LTHELD strategies tend to be highly related, suggesting that large positions are often built up 
over time.  BET and INDEXP also tend to be related, indicating that institutions placing a big bet 
on a single stock tend to take bets on the other firms in that stock’s industry.  Overall, there is 
significant overlap in many of these private information proxies, indicating the importance of 
controlling for multiple characteristics in the empirical analysis. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Regressions using firm-level aggregation 
 Table 3 presents results from regressions using firm-level aggregation of the institutional 
holdings based on the private information proxies (equation (7)).  The first column lists the 
dependent variable, the next column indicates whether the coefficients in the rows pertain to 
past, current, or future performance measures, and the next columns represent the four different 
performance measures, which are estimated in separate regressions.  Significance tests are two-
tailed and based on the standard error from the distribution of quarterly regression coefficients.   
The first set of rows presents results for changes in total institutional ownership (ALL) as 
the dependent variable.  We find that institutional ownership is positively associated with current 
analyst forecast errors (AFE), consistent with Lang and McNichols [1997].  Future forecast 
errors are insignificant, suggesting that institutional investors, as a group, do not exhibit trading 
based on better information than analysts.  Changes in total institutional ownership are positively 
associated with prior and current returns around earnings announcements (CAR) and over three-
month intervals (BHAR3 and BHAR12).14  These results do not support hypothesis 1 and 
suggest that institutions as a group are momentum traders, buying winners and selling losers 
                                                 
14 Recall that, for the BHAR12 regressions, prior and current returns are measured over the same three-month period 
as the change in institutional ownership, whereas future returns are measured over 12-month periods. 
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after the fact.  Consistent with Ali, et al. [2004], there is a positive relation between institutional 
trading and future earnings announcements CAR.  While this positive coefficient is consistent 
with hypothesis 2, the fact that the coefficients on current and past performance are also positive 
suggests that these results reflect a risk-based explanation (e.g., institutions buy [sell] firms with 
higher [lower] risk and expected returns), rather than private information trading.  
The decomposition into fiduciary types reveals that both BANK and IIA institutions are 
similar to the total population of institutions, consistent with Ali, et al. [2004].  The negative 
coefficients on the buy-and-hold return measures for changes in P&E ownership are consistent 
with hypothesis 1 and suggest some anticipation of current news and/or cashing out of prior 
profitable trading.  However, if P&E institutions are trading based on private information, it must 
pertain to periods longer than one year, on average, as there is no relation between P&E trading 
and future returns.  Despite the fact that there is below average overlap between P&E and 
VALUE, the results for the two types are similar, suggesting some overlap in trading strategies.   
The results for GROWTH, TRANSIENT, and LARGE institutions are also very similar 
to ALL institutions and to each other.  Coefficients on current AFE and on the three prior and 
current returns measures are positive and strongly significant.  Again, this body of results is not 
consistent with anticipating news or “cashing out” on prior informed trades; instead, it suggests 
momentum trading based on realized performance.  However, consistent with hypothesis 2, 
changes in holdings by GROWTH and TRANSIENT institutions are significantly positively 
related to future AFE, suggesting that these institutions have better information than analysts (for 
TRANSIENT institutions, this result is consistent with Ke and Petroni [2004]).  For all three 
types of institutions, their trading is positively related to future CAR, again consistent with 
hypothesis 2, but negatively associated with BHAR12, suggesting that any private information 
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must be related to short-term news.  However, the question remains of why we do not see these 
institutions cashing out after trading successfully based on future CAR, making it difficult to 
disentangle informed trading from trading based on risk preferences.  Moreover, the fact that 
they systematically change their holdings in response to past CAR suggests that they did not 
fully anticipate the news during the earnings announcement.   
Changes in holdings for BLOCK and BET institutions are significantly negatively related 
to prior and current return performance measures, consistent with hypothesis 1, and positively 
related to future BHAR12, consistent with private information trading based on returns over the 
subsequent 12 months.  This set of results suggests that institutions taking BLOCK or BET 
positions are trading based on private information about return performance over the subsequent 
year.  This is the strongest, most consistent evidence of informed trading in Table 3.   
Finally, there is little evidence of significant relations between trading by INDEXP and 
LTHELD institutions and any of the performance measures.  Changes in holdings by INDEXP 
institutions are positively associated with current buy-and-hold returns, but no future 
performance measures.  Changes in holdings by LTHELD institutions are only significantly 
related to prior return measures.     
 Overall, the results most consistent with private information trading in table 3 are for 
institutions that hold large blocks and take big portfolio bets.  These results exhibit both the 
trading in advance of future performance and the cashing out based on prior and current 
performance.  While some other investor characteristics are positively related to future 
performance (e.g., GROWTH, TRANSIENT, LARGE), these proxies are also positively related 
to past and current performance, suggesting momentum or risk-based trading rather than trading 
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to reverse positions taken in the past based on private information.  Thus, the evidence is mixed 
on whether the other proxies are indicators for the superior private information.  
 
5.2 Results using HLM  
In Table 4, we present results from estimating the quarterly HLM regressions (equation 
(10)) and report the mean coefficients and two-tailed significance tests based on a standard error 
from the quarterly distribution of coefficients.15  We only report the coefficients on the 
interactions between the performance measures and private information proxies, as these 
represent whether an investor trades are aligned with price movements in a manner that is 
consistent with private information.  We do not report the main effects as these merely represent 
the mean change in holdings for each institutional investor characteristic (conditional on the 
other characteristics) independent of firm performance measures.  These means all tend to be 
small and do not provide any evidence relevant to the existence of private information trading. 
 The first striking piece of evidence from Table 4 is that the interactions between proxies 
for fiduciary type of institution (BANK, IIA, and P&E) and performance measures are now 
largely insignificant once the other characteristics are included in the model.  There are no 
significant associations with future performance measures; although the evidence of momentum 
(contrarian) trading by IIA (P&E) with regards to current returns remains significant.  For banks, 
the only significant result is a positive relation between changes in holdings and current analyst 
forecast errors.  Thus, the fiduciary type of an institution appears to be a poor proxy for 
differences in private information across institutions. 
 Table 4 presents mixed results for the other institution-level characteristics.  As in Table 
3, changes in holdings by VALUE institutions are negatively associated with prior and current 
                                                 
15 We multiply the coefficients by 100 in these regressions because the changes in percentage ownership at the 
individual institutional investor level tend to be quite small. 
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return-based measures, consistent with hypothesis 1.  However, there is no evidence of a positive 
association between VALUE trading and future performance.  In fact, changes in VALUE 
holdings are negatively related to future AFE and CAR, suggesting that, if VALUE investors are 
trading based on private information, it must be manifested in earnings or returns beyond one 
year.  The GROWTH, TRANSIENT, and LARGE characteristics all remain significantly 
positively associated with prior and current return performance in the HLM model, consistent 
with momentum trading, but not informed trading.   The positive relations between these 
characteristics and future CAR are only significant in the HLM model for GROWTH, suggesting 
that that the Ali, et al. [2004] finding is driven by growth institutions within the IIA type.  Other 
than this result, the only evidence among these characteristics consistent with informed trading is 
the significant positive relation between TRANSIENT trading and future AFE.   
The HLM results for the BLOCK and BET proxies are similar to the results in Table 3.16  
Changes in holdings by institutions with large blocks and large portfolio bets in firms are 
negatively related to past and current returns, consistent with hypothesis 1.  Moreover, both 
proxies are positively associated with BHAR12, consistent with hypothesis 2 in regards to 
private information about longer-term returns.17  Thus, the evidence suggests that BLOCK and 
BET are fundamental proxies for private information that are not capturing some other factor.   
Unlike Table 3, the results for the INDEXP now suggest private information trading 
consistent with hypothesis 1.  Table 4 reports a negative association between INDEXP and both 
prior and current BHAR3 and BHAR12, whereas these relations were either insignificant or 
                                                 
16 The only difference from Table 3 is that BET is significantly negatively associated with future CAR.  The source 
of this negative relation is unclear, and may indicate that informed trading by BET institutions impounds their 
information into price before the earnings announcement, producing a negative relation. 
17 We also looked at future returns for six-month (BHAR6) and nine-month (BHAR9) windows.  The positive 
relation between BET/BLOCK and BHAR6 (BHAR9) is significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level.  Thus, these institutions 
appear to be trading on information that will impact price beyond one-quarter ahead. 
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positive in Table 3.  In Table 2, we show that institutions taking industry bets tend to have an 
above-average representation of IIA and VALUE institutions.  In Table 3, the results for IIA and 
VALUE were significant, but opposite sign, suggesting a suppressor effect when INDEXP is 
examined in isolation.  Once IIA and VALUE are controlled for, the results suggest that 
INDEXP is consistent with cashing out or anticipating current return performance.  Finally, 
LTHELD is positively associated with prior, current, and future AFE, suggesting momentum 
trading.  None of these relations were significant in Table 3, again suggesting a suppressor effect.  
 Overall, the results of this section highlight the importance of controlling for multiple 
private information proxies in one analysis.  Prior evidence that the fiduciary type of an 
institution is related to private information trading is likely driven by associations with more 
direct private information proxies.  A lack of evidence that industry bets are associated with 
informed trading is due to a suppressor effect that is eliminated when other characteristics are 
controlled for.  The clearest evidence of private information trading occurs with the return-based 
performance measures.  Other than the positive association between changes in TRANSIENT 
and LTHELD holdings and future AFE, there is little evidence of informed trading relative to 
earnings surprises.  Finally, the strongest evidence of private information trading is found among 
institutions that hold large positions in firms, either in terms of percent ownership or percent of 
their portfolio. 
 
5.3 Sensitivity analyses 
The KV model suggests that risk aversion could influence the extent to which an investor 
exploits their private information, but not necessarily the direction of their trade.  To remove 
variation in trades due to risk aversion, we examine the decision to buy or sell a given stock.  We 
define a buy/hold/sell indicator variable based on changes in holdings, with buys equal to 1, sells 
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equal to -1, and holds equal to 0.  We then estimate equation (10) with the buy/hold/sell indicator 
as the dependent variable.18 
The results of this analysis are similar to Table 4 with only a few exceptions (not tabled).  
The BLOCK proxy is no longer significantly associated with future BHAR12 with the 
buy/hold/sell indicator.  Thus, the magnitude of the trade is important for detecting informed 
trading by BLOCK institutions, whereas it is not important for BET institutions.   The relation 
between TRANSIENT trading and future AFE is also no longer significant with the indicator 
variable, suggesting that magnitude matters here as well.  Finally, there are no meaningful 
differences in results for fiduciary type, indicating that the lack of informed trading results is not 
due to risk aversion effects, but rather to fiduciary type failing to proxy for private information 
trading incremental to the other characteristics in the model. 
We also estimated the HLM model in Table 4 with the sample partitioned into small, 
medium, and large firms, based on treciles of market value of equity (not tabled).  Private 
information trading is more likely to be present in smaller firms, as large firms often have rich 
public information environments (e.g., more analyst following, more conference calls) and less 
opportunity for informed trading.  We find that the pattern of informed trading results for 
BLOCK (BET) is driven by the small (small and medium) firms, consistent with the higher 
likelihood of finding informed trading among small firms.  In contrast, the “cashing out” 
behavior of VALUE intuitions in Table 4 is equally strong across all size subsamples, making it 
less likely that this result reflects informed trading. 
                                                 
18 This analysis is done using a linear probability model (OLS) rather than a multinomial logit because computing 
fixed effects in logistic models is not as straightforward as de-meaning linear models and require considerable 
computing time given the number of observations.  The primary advantages of logit estimation are that the standard 
errors are less susceptible to heteroskedasticity and the probabilities will be bounded between 0 and 1 (Greene 
[2000]).  Because we use Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, heteroskedasticity in any single quarterly model will not be a 
concern since the estimates will still be unbiased.  We also do not use the predicted values, so values that exceed the 
reasonable bounds for probabilities are not an issue. 
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5.4 Interactions among private information proxies 
To provide additional evidence on the specific characteristics associated with informed 
trading, we interact some of the institution-firm-level proxies with the other proxies for private 
information.  First, we interact the indicator for whether an institution has a large position in a 
portfolio firm (BLOCK and BET) with the other characteristics.  For parsimony, we combine the 
two proxies to create an indicator variable that equals 1 if BLOCK or BET equals 1, and zero 
otherwise.  This analysis will reveal whether the strong evidence of informed trading based on 
BET and BLOCK is concentrated among other characteristics or is a more general result.  
Moreover, conditioning on the presence of a large stake in a given stock provides a more 
powerful test for hypothesis 1.  If holding a BLOCK or BET position entails costs due to lack of 
diversification, then a reduction in the expected benefits to holding that position (i.e., the 
realization of the private information) would create incentives to reduce the position 
immediately, rather than continue to hold an abnormally large position.  
Table 5 provides the results of the HLM estimation of equation (10) with all private 
information proxies (except BLOCK and BET) interacted with the indicator variable for whether 
the institution has a BLOCK or BET in place for a given firm.  The table shows that the 
significant informed trading results observed for BLOCK and BET characteristics in Table 4 are 
concentrated in IIA and LARGE institutions that have BLOCK or BET equal to 1.19  Thus, 
private information trading is most evident when large positions in firms are taken by investment 
advisers, which have limited fiduciary responsibilities and lower risk aversion, and by large 
institutions, which have greater resources and potentially more access to management.   
                                                 
19 P&E institutions that have a BLOCK or BET also exhibit the same results as BLOCK and BET except there is no 
significant relation with future performance.  Thus, any private information trading by P&E institutions must relate 
to performance more than one-year in the future. 
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Table 5 also shows that the momentum trading results for GROWTH, TRANSIENT, and 
LARGE institutions are concentrated in small positions (BET and BLOCK = 0).20  Interestingly, 
LARGE institutions with small positions in firms are simply momentum trading, whereas large 
positions are taken when the institutions has private information.  The results for VALUE 
institutions indicate evidence of contrarian trading in response to prior and current return 
performance regardless of whether the fund has a large position or not.  Finally, institutions with 
holdings in the firm of less than a year (LTHELD) and small positions exhibit evidence 
consistent with informed trading for BHAR12.  This result indicates that institutions are less 
likely to take large positions based on private information if they have held a stock for more than 
a year. 
Next, we interact the indicator for whether an institution has held a position for a year 
(LTHELD) with the other proxies.  Although there is no evidence that LTHELD alone proxies 
for informed trading, this analysis will provide additional evidence on whether contrarian trading 
based on prior and current news reflects prior private information or some other explanation.  In 
Table 6, we interact all of the private information proxies (except LTHELD) with LTHELD and 
estimate equation (10).  For BLOCK and BET, the informed trading results are only found for 
large positions held less than one year.  These results suggest that some institutions with private 
information take a large BLOCK or BET position in an undervalued firm, hold it more than one 
quarter but less than a year, and then cash out the position when the positive returns are realized 
(or, alternatively, before negative returns are realized). 
Table 6 also shows that the contrarian trading with respect to prior and current return 
performance for P&E, VALUE, and INDEXP is only present in positions that have been held for 
                                                 
20 When transient investors have large positions, there is a negative relation with future CAR.  It is possible that this 
result could reflect informed trading if the block trades of informed transient investors causes price to impound the 
private information prior to the earnings announcement. 
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less than one year.  Again, these results suggest that private information trading results in short-
term positions; however, the lack of evidence of trading in advance of future performance makes 
it unclear whether these results reflect informed trading or some other explanation. 
Finally, Table 6 shows that the momentum trading by GROWTH, TRANSIENT, and 
LARGE institutions is present in positions held less than one year.  In long-term positions, 
GROWTH and TRANSIENT institutions exhibit contrarian trading with respect to prior and 
current performance, consistent with hypothesis 1.  Interestingly, for BHAR3 and BHAR12, 
there is also evidence consistent with hypothesis 2 for GROWTH institutions holding a position 
longer than one year.  This result suggests that once a growth institution has held a firm for more 
than a year, it has gained a private information advantage that allows it to execute informed 
trading based on future returns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature on informed trading by institutional 
investors by analyzing new proxies for the conditions in which an investor may have private 
information, by employing a HLM methodology that controls for the overlap across investor 
classifications, and by examining both the creation and liquidation of positions consistent with 
information-based trading.  We find that changes in ownership by institutions that have created a 
large position in a specific firm (both in terms of percent ownership and percent of its portfolio) 
are consistent with trading based on private information.  Other previously-documented proxies 
for private information produce results that are more consistent with momentum or risk-based 
trading (e.g., transient institutions and preferences for growth) or that are insignificant in the 
presence of the other proxies (e.g., banks, investment advisers).  The clearest evidence of private 
information trading occurs with the return-based performance measures; there is limited 
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evidence of informed trading related to earnings-based measures (e.g., analyst forecast errors).  
Finally, tests for interactions among private information proxies reveal that informed trading is 
most evident when large positions in firms are newly initiated and when they are taken by 
investment advisers (which have limited fiduciary responsibilities) and by large institutions 
(which have greater resources and potentially more access to management).   
 The results of this paper are subject to a number of limitations.  The mismatch between 
the quarterly institutional holdings data and daily or intra-day price movements reduces the 
power of the tests to identify informed trading.  In addition, to implement our HLM 
methodology, we make a number of research design choices, such as only examining firms with 
at least 50 institutional owners and only examining institutions with at least three years of data, 
that eliminate smaller firms and institutions for which informed trading may be more prevalent.  
Thus, our results may understate the amount of informed trading.  However, we do find that 
examining proxies that measure an institution’s investment in each portfolio firm yields enough 
power to detect informed trading despite the timing mismatch.  We also demonstrate the 
potential biases of failing to control for multiple institutional investor characteristics in the same 
model and failing to interpret the signs on both current and future performance measures.  
Because private information is difficult to measure, we suggest that future work employ the 
research design and HLM methodology of this paper to further examine the extent to which 
institutions possess private information before announcements and/or a superior advantage in 
interpreting public disclosures.  
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions and Timeline 
 
Panel A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
∆IHjt Shares held at time t —  Shares held at time t-1 Total shares outstanding at time t  Total shares outstanding at time t-1  
 
Performance Proxies (Zjt-1, Zjt, Zjt+1) 
 
AFE 
Actual earnings per share (EPS) (according to IBES) minus the last consensus analyst’ forecast 
of EPS prior to prior to the end of the calendar quarter, deflated by the price per share on the 
forecast date. 
CAR  Three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted return in the window (-2, 0) around the earnings announcement. 
BHAR3 Buy-and-hold returns for the stock less the buy-and-hold returns for the firm's size decile over the calendar quarter. 
BHAR12 Current and past returns are the same as the variables in the BHAR3 regressions, but future performance is measured over the following 12 month periods. 
 
Institution-level (X2i) private information proxies 
 
BANK An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a bank based on the classification scheme used in Abarbanell et al. (2003) 
P&E An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a Pension/Endowment based on the classification scheme used in Abarbanell et al. (2003) 
IIA An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a Independent Investment advisor based on the classification scheme used in Abarbanell et al. (2003) 
VALUE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a value investor based on the classification scheme used in Abarbanell et al. (2003) 
GROWTH An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a growth investor based on the classification scheme used in Abarbanell et al. (2003) 
TRANSIENT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution is classified as a transient based on the classification scheme used in Bushee 2001 
LARGE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the market value of assets managed by the institution is in the top quintile of all institutions in a given calendar quarter. 
 
Institution-firm-level (X1ij) private information proxies 
 
LTHELD An indicator variable equal to 1 if the institution has held the stock for four consecutive quarters as of time t-2. 
BLOCK An indicator variable equal to 1 if the percent of a firm held by an institution is in the top quintile of all institutions that own shares in that firm. 
BET An indicator variable equal to 1 if the proportion of an institution’s portfolio (based on market value) in a given firm is in the top quintile of all institutions that own shares in that firm. 
INDEXP 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the proportion of an institution’s portfolio (based on market 
value) in a firm’s 2-digit SIC code is in the top quintile of all institutions that own shares in that 
firm. 
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Appendix (continued)  
Variable Definitions and Timeline 
 
Panel B: Timeline for variable measurement  
 
Time    Variable measured 
     
   
t-2   Institutional investor characteristics (X1ij and X2i) @ t-2 
   Past Performance (Zjt-1) = between t-2 and t-1 
  
} 
t-1    
   ∆IHjt  = between t-1 and t Current Performance (Zjt) = between t-1 and t 
  
} 
t    
   Future Performance (Zjt+1) = between t and t+1 
  
} 
t+1    
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Q1 Median Q3 
         
 
Change in ownership by an 
individual institution 11,664,695 0.000 0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
∆ total ownership by:        
 All Institutions          82,601  0.031 0.032  0.010 0.025 0.045 
 BANK          82,601  0.005 0.010  -0.001 0.004 0.010 
 P&E          82,601  0.003 0.005  0.000 0.002 0.005 
 IIA          82,601  0.021 0.026  0.004 0.016 0.032 
 VALUE          82,601  0.009 0.014  0.000 0.007 0.016 
 GROWTH          82,601  0.008 0.015  -0.001 0.004 0.013 
 TRANSIENT          82,601  0.014 0.021  0.001 0.009 0.022 
 LARGE          82,601  0.023 0.028  0.005 0.018 0.036 
 BLOCK          82,601  -0.005 0.018  -0.014 -0.004 0.005 
 BET          82,601  -0.006 0.015  -0.013 -0.005 0.002 
 INDEXP          82,601  0.005 0.013  -0.002 0.003 0.011 
 LTHELD          82,601  -0.001 0.018  -0.010 0.000 0.009 
         
AFE sample        
 Past performance          42,119  0.004 0.060  -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 Current performance          42,119  0.004 0.063  -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 Future performance          42,119  0.003 0.069  -0.001 0.000 0.001 
         
CAR sample        
 Past performance          76,684  0.004 0.048  -0.020 0.002 0.026 
 Current performance          76,684  0.003 0.048  -0.021 0.002 0.026 
 Future performance          76,684  0.003 0.048  -0.021 0.001 0.025 
         
BHAR3 sample        
 Past performance          80,526  0.015 0.182  -0.086 0.004 0.101 
 Current performance          80,526  0.010 0.180  -0.089 0.001 0.097 
 Future performance          80,526  0.002 0.176  -0.091 0.000 0.088 
         
BHAR12 sample        
 Past performance          79,867  0.015 0.182  -0.086 0.004 0.101 
 Current performance          79,867  0.009 0.180  -0.089 0.001 0.097 
 Future performance          79,867  0.002 0.379  -0.199 0.000 0.162 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the change in ownership and performance variables.  The quartile 
descriptive statistics for the change in ownership by an individual institution is the average of quartiles that are 
calculated quarterly because of difficulty calculating the quartiles with a large number of observations.  The total 
change in ownership by institutions of a given type is the aggregate change in ownership in a given firm-quarter by 
institutions with a given characteristic.  All performance proxies are measured at the firm-quarter level.  Variable 
definitions are given in panel A of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 2 
Associations among Private Information Proxies 
Panel A: Institution-specific characteristics 
   Difference between percent for type of institution and percent for ALL  
   Characteristic     ALL BANK P&E IIA VALUE GROWTH TRANSIENT LARGE
BANK      28.5%  -8.4% -10.7% -17.9% 1.1%
P&E      
      
         
        
         
         
          
         
         
          
9.5%  -0.7% -3.7% -3.5% 1.0%
IIA 52.9%  8.4% 17.8% 22.3% -3.3%
VALUE 27.9%  -8.3% -2.0% 4.4% 2.9% -2.6%
GROWTH 18.9%  -7.1% -7.4% 6.4% 6.2% -1.5%
TRANSIENT
 
31.5% -19.8% -11.6% 13.3% 3.3% 10.3% 0.8%
LARGE 58.7% 2.2% 5.9% -3.6% -5.5% -4.7% 1.5%
BLOCK 19.9% -2.0% -0.1% 0.9% 0.0% -0.8% -2.2% 9.3%
BET 19.9% -8.6% -4.5% 6.2% 5.1% 4.5% 0.7% -7.0%
INDEXP 19.8% -3.0% -5.6% 3.2% 4.4% 1.4% -0.1% -1.4%
LTHELD 59.6% 7.7% -0.2% -5.4% -3.6% -6.6% -14.6% 4.5%
 
Panel B: Institution-firm match characteristics 
   Difference between percent for type of institution and percent for ALL  
     Characteristic   ALL  BLOCK BET INDEXP LTHELD
BANK      28.5%  -2.8% -12.3% -4.3% 3.7%  
P&E    
    
        
       
       
        
        
     
        
        
9.5%  0.0% -2.1% -2.7% 0.0%  
IIA 52.9%  2.3% 16.5% 8.6% -4.8%  
VALUE 27.9% -0.1% 7.2% 6.2% -1.7%  
GROWTH 18.9%  -0.7% 4.3% 1.4% -2.1%  
TRANSIENT 31.5% -3.4% 1.1% -0.1% -7.7%  
LARGE 58.7% 27.6% -20.8% -4.3% 4.5%  
BLOCK 19.9% 25.5%
 
4.6% 7.5%  
BET 19.9%  25.5% 11.0% 4.0%  
INDEXP 19.8% 4.6% 11.0% 0.7%  
LTHELD 59.6% 22.5% 12.0% 2.1%  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the overlap among various institutional investor classifications.  Variable definitions are given in panel A of the 
Appendix.  The values in each cell report the percent of institutions of a given type (the column label) that are also classified as another characteristic (the row 
label), less the percent of all institutions that are classified as that characteristic (the ALL column).  Panel A presents institutional investor characteristics that are 
constant across all of a given institution’s holdings.  Panel B presents institutional investor characteristics that reflect the relation between a given institution and 
particular firms in its portfolio.  All calculations are based on the sample of 82,601 firm-quarters. 
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TABLE 3 
Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings Aggregated by Private Information Proxies 
on Performance Measures 
 
Dependent   Performance Measure 
Variable Perf. Period  AFE  CAR  BHAR3  BHAR12 
ALL Past   0.052*  0.024**  0.010**  0.010** 
 Current   0.110**  0.034**  0.022**  0.022** 
 Future   0.019  0.008*  0.000  -0.002* 
          
BANK Past   0.025**  0.007**  0.003**  0.003** 
 Current   0.063**  0.006**  0.003**  0.003** 
 Future   0.004  0.001  0.000  0.000* 
          
P&E Past   0.002  0.000  -0.001*  -0.001* 
 Current   -0.003  -0.001  -0.001**  -0.001** 
 Future   -0.006  0.001  0.000  0.000 
          
IIA Past   0.008  0.014**  0.006**  0.007** 
 Current   0.039  0.025**  0.019**  0.019** 
 Future   0.023  0.007**  0.000  -0.001 
          
VALUE  Past   0.000  -0.008**  -0.009**  -0.009** 
 Current   0.006  -0.012**  -0.010**  -0.010** 
 Future   -0.048**  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
          
GROWTH Past   0.024  0.021**  0.016**  0.016** 
 Current   0.067**  0.035**  0.023**  0.024** 
 Future   0.045**  0.006**  0.000  -0.001* 
          
TRANSIENT  Past   0.033*  0.022**  0.015**  0.015** 
 Current   0.123**  0.037**  0.023**  0.023** 
 Future   0.048**  0.005*  0.000  -0.001** 
          
LARGE Past   0.038*  0.020**  0.009**  0.010** 
 Current   0.120**  0.030**  0.019**  0.020** 
 Future   0.021  0.008**  -0.001  -0.001* 
          
BLOCK Past   -0.041**  -0.009**  -0.009**  -0.009** 
 Current   -0.017  -0.009**  -0.005**  -0.005** 
 Future   -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001** 
          
BET Past   -0.020*  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.010** 
 Current   -0.053**  -0.016**  -0.009**  -0.009** 
 Future   -0.009  -0.001  0.001  0.001** 
          
INDEXP Past   0.006  0.002  0.000  0.000 
 Current   -0.008  0.002  0.002**  0.002** 
 Future   -0.010  0.001  0.000  0.000 
          
LTHELD Past   -0.014  -0.005**  -0.006**  -0.006** 
 Current   0.018  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001 
 Future   -0.021  0.003  0.001  0.000 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in ownership for a given 
type of institution aggregated at the firm-quarter level.  These changes are regressed on past, current, and future 
performance measures.  We report the average regression coefficient from quarterly regressions with significance 
tests based on Fama-MacBeth t-statistics.  There are 79, 87, 87, and 84 quarterly regressions for AFE, CAR, 
BHAR3, and BHAR12, respectively.  The label in the Dependent Variable column indicates the type of institution 
whose holdings are aggregated and the column labels indicate the definition of performance measure for a given 
regression.  Intercepts are estimated, but not reported.  Variable definitions are given in panel A of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
HLM Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings on Performance Measures Interacted 
with Private Information Proxies 
 
Interactions  Performance Measure 
Characteristic Perf. Period  AFE  CAR  BHAR3  BHAR12 
          
BANK Past   -0.059  -0.008  0.003  0.004 
 Current   0.239**  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 Future   0.094  0.007  0.000  0.000 
          
P&E Past   -0.080  -0.017*  -0.003  -0.003 
 Current   0.015  -0.009  -0.007*  -0.008* 
 Future   0.007  0.015  0.001  -0.002 
          
IIA Past   -0.224**  -0.015  -0.009**  -0.010** 
 Current   -0.124  0.001  0.011**  0.010** 
 Future   -0.020  0.010  0.000  -0.001 
          
VALUE  Past   -0.061  -0.036**  -0.028**  -0.029** 
 Current   -0.005  -0.050**  -0.044**  -0.044** 
 Future   -0.231**  -0.009  0.000  0.001 
          
GROWTH Past   0.080  0.051**  0.053**  0.055** 
 Current   0.230**  0.112**  0.070**  0.071** 
 Future   0.113  0.015*  0.001  -0.002 
          
TRANSIENT  Past   0.032  0.043**  0.042**  0.043** 
 Current   0.528**  0.087**  0.059**  0.062** 
 Future   0.297**  0.005  0.000  -0.001 
          
LARGE Past   0.084  0.013*  0.014**  0.014** 
 Current   0.179**  0.032**  0.025**  0.026** 
 Future   0.084  0.007  0.000  0.000 
          
BLOCK Past   -0.292*  -0.054**  -0.042**  -0.042** 
 Current   0.002  -0.047**  -0.028**  -0.027** 
 Future   0.132  -0.005  0.003  0.005** 
          
BET Past   0.119  -0.061**  -0.046**  -0.044** 
 Current   -0.215*  -0.100**  -0.064**  -0.062** 
 Future   0.117  -0.018*  0.005  0.005** 
          
INDEXP Past   0.020  -0.008  -0.005**  -0.005* 
 Current   -0.105*  -0.011*  -0.007**  -0.007** 
 Future   -0.043  0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
          
LTHELD Past   0.104*  0.005  0.006*  0.006* 
 Current   0.254**  -0.006  -0.004  -0.004 
 Future   0.142*  0.006  0.000  0.001 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
 
This table reports the summary of the results from Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) regressions where the 
dependent variable is the change in ownership for an individual institution and the independent variables include 
private information proxies and the interaction of these proxies with past, current, and future performance measures.  
We report the average regression coefficient from quarterly regressions with significance tests based on Fama-
MacBeth t-statistics.  There are 79, 87, 87, and 84 quarterly regressions for AFE, CAR, BHAR3, and BHAR12, 
respectively.  All coefficients are multiplied by 100.  All dependent and independent variables are mean centered at 
the firm-quarter level to remove fixed effects.  Intercepts and main effects for all private information proxies are 
estimated, but not reported.  The column labels indicate the definition of performance measure for a given 
regression.  All variable definitions are given in panel A of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
HLM Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings on Performance Measures Interacted 
with Private Information Proxies and with an Indicator for Large Positions in Firms 
 
Interactions  Performance Measure / Interaction with Block or Bet 
   AFE AFE  CAR CAR 
Characteristic Perf. Period  Block and Bet = 0 Block or Bet = 1  Block and Bet = 0 Block or Bet = 1 
        
BANK Past   -0.053 -0.016  -0.006 0.010 
 Current   0.100 0.618**  0.008 -0.007 
 Future   0.044 0.186  0.011 -0.011 
        
P&E Past   -0.104 0.024  -0.007 -0.030* 
 Current   0.032 -0.049  0.004 -0.049** 
 Future   0.077 -0.228  0.022** -0.026 
        
IIA Past   -0.233** 0.055  -0.005 -0.050** 
 Current   -0.126 -0.017  0.018* -0.083** 
 Future   -0.110 0.317**  0.013 -0.018 
        
VALUE  Past   -0.109* 0.124  -0.030** -0.024* 
 Current   0.023 -0.153  -0.026** -0.096** 
 Future   -0.156** -0.166  -0.004 -0.020 
        
GROWTH Past   0.081 0.014  0.063** -0.047** 
 Current   0.355** -0.413*  0.108** -0.018 
 Future   0.043 0.371  0.020* -0.017 
        
TRANSIENT  Past   0.148* -0.378**  0.047** -0.016 
 Current   0.537** -0.091  0.081** 0.016 
 Future   0.270** 0.131  0.010 -0.018 
        
LARGE Past   0.107 -0.342*  0.021** -0.038** 
 Current   0.195** -0.004  0.043** -0.026 
 Future   0.058 0.171  0.004 0.008 
        
INDEXP Past   0.040 -0.072  -0.005 -0.011 
 Current   -0.019 -0.252*  -0.004 -0.029* 
 Future   -0.077 0.125  -0.001 0.006 
        
LTHELD Past   0.037 0.211  -0.010 0.036** 
 Current   0.195** 0.135  -0.028** 0.058** 
 Future   0.191** -0.213  0.000 0.023 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
HLM Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings on Performance Measures Interacted 
with Private Information Proxies and with an Indicator for Large Positions in Firms 
 
Interactions  Performance Measure / Interaction with Block or Bet 
   BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR12 BHAR12 
Characteristic Perf. Period  Block and Bet = 0 Block or Bet = 1  Block and Bet = 0 Block or Bet = 1 
        
BANK Past   0.000 0.020**  0.001 0.018** 
 Current   0.004 0.003  0.005 0.001 
 Future   0.001 -0.002  0.000 -0.001 
        
P&E Past   0.000 -0.016*  0.000 -0.017** 
 Current   0.003 -0.034**  0.002 -0.036** 
 Future   0.002 -0.003  -0.001 0.000 
        
IIA Past   -0.002 -0.038**  -0.003 -0.038** 
 Current   0.018** -0.039**  0.018** -0.039** 
 Future   -0.001 0.001  -0.003* 0.005** 
        
VALUE  Past   -0.020** -0.036**  -0.021** -0.037** 
 Current   -0.025** -0.073**  -0.025** -0.075** 
 Future   0.002 -0.006  0.002 -0.002 
        
GROWTH Past   0.049** 0.000  0.050** 0.001 
 Current   0.067** -0.012  0.069** -0.012 
 Future   -0.002 0.011*  -0.004* 0.007** 
        
TRANSIENT  Past   0.039** 0.007  0.040** 0.008 
 Current   0.054** 0.012*  0.057** 0.014* 
 Future   -0.001 0.004  -0.002* 0.003 
        
LARGE Past   0.018** -0.022**  0.018** -0.023** 
 Current   0.033** -0.015**  0.034** -0.015** 
 Future   -0.002 0.006  -0.002* 0.005** 
        
INDEXP Past   -0.002 -0.011*  -0.002 -0.011* 
 Current   -0.004 -0.016**  -0.003 -0.016** 
 Future   0.001 -0.005  -0.001 -0.001 
        
LTHELD Past   0.000 0.000  0.000 0.002 
 Current   -0.015** 0.022**  -0.016** 0.024** 
 Future   0.001 -0.001  0.002* -0.003* 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
 
This table reports the summary of the results from Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) regressions where the 
dependent variable is the change in ownership for an individual institution and the independent variables include 
private information proxies and the interaction of these proxies with past, current, and future performance measures.  
These variables are further interacted with an indicator for whether the institution has a large position in the firm, in 
terms of percentage ownership or percent of portfolio (Block or Bet =1), or a small position (Block and Bet =0).  We 
report the average regression coefficient from quarterly regressions with significance tests based on Fama-MacBeth 
t-statistics.  There are 79, 87, 87, and 84 quarterly regressions for AFE, CAR, BHAR3, and BHAR12, respectively.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100.  All dependent and independent variables are mean centered at the firm-
quarter level to remove fixed effects.  Intercepts and main effects for all private information proxies are estimated, 
but not reported.  The column labels indicate the definition of performance measure for a given regression and the 
interaction with the Block or Bet indicator.  All variable definitions are given in panel A of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 6 
HLM Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings on Performance Measures Interacted 
with Private Information Proxies and with an Indicator for Long-Term Holdings of a Firm 
 
Interactions  Performance Measure / Interaction with LTHELD 
   AFE AFE  CAR CAR 
Characteristic Perf. Period  LTHELD = 0 LTHELD = 1  LTHELD = 0 LTHELD = 1 
        
BANK Past   -0.126 0.112  -0.018 0.018* 
 Current   0.030 0.350*  -0.027** 0.048** 
 Future   0.009 0.124  0.004 0.004 
        
P&E Past   -0.218* 0.129  -0.032* 0.016 
 Current   -0.168 0.227*  -0.028* 0.024 
 Future   -0.018 0.017  0.019 -0.011 
        
IIA Past   -0.333** 0.140  -0.024* -0.003 
 Current   -0.378** 0.378**  -0.017 0.017 
 Future   -0.140 0.184*  0.011 -0.003 
        
VALUE  Past   -0.176* 0.149  -0.056** 0.032** 
 Current   -0.016 -0.005  -0.057** 0.009 
 Future   -0.269** 0.092  -0.009 -0.001 
        
GROWTH Past   0.001 0.072  0.062** -0.044** 
 Current   0.400** -0.377*  0.157** -0.107** 
 Future   0.014 0.182  0.020 -0.013 
        
TRANSIENT  Past   0.103 -0.182  0.050** -0.027* 
 Current   0.655** -0.358**  0.100** -0.040** 
 Future   0.382** -0.205  0.010 -0.012 
        
LARGE Past   0.148* -0.224**  0.005 -0.009 
 Current   0.154 -0.055  0.046** -0.041** 
 Future   0.076 -0.009  0.005 0.006 
        
BLOCK Past   -0.618** 0.512**  -0.076** 0.047* 
 Current   -0.451* 0.672*  -0.114** 0.106** 
 Future   0.463 -0.400  -0.031 0.035 
        
BET Past   0.153 -0.033  -0.061** 0.018 
 Current   -0.045 -0.159  -0.091** 0.003 
 Future   0.068 0.006  -0.028 0.026 
        
INDEXP Past   -0.005 0.061  -0.008 0.001 
 Current   -0.093 -0.015  -0.011 0.000 
 Future   -0.102 0.075  -0.007 0.015 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
HLM Regressions of the Change in Institutional Holdings on Performance Measures Interacted 
with Private Information Proxies and with an Indicator for Long-Term Holdings of a Firm 
 
Interactions  Performance Measure / Interaction with Block or Bet 
   BHAR3 BHAR3  BHAR12 BHAR12 
Characteristic Perf. Period  LTHELD = 0 LTHELD = 1  LTHELD = 0 LTHELD = 1 
        
BANK Past   -0.010* 0.023**  -0.009 0.022** 
 Current   -0.014** 0.027**  -0.013** 0.026** 
 Future   0.002 -0.003  0.001 -0.001 
        
P&E Past   -0.013* 0.009  -0.013* 0.010 
 Current   -0.020** 0.018**  -0.022** 0.019** 
 Future   0.006 -0.007  -0.001 0.000 
        
IIA Past   -0.020** 0.008  -0.021** 0.008 
 Current   0.000 0.010*  -0.001 0.011* 
 Future   0.001 -0.002  -0.002 0.003 
        
VALUE  Past   -0.034** 0.008*  -0.035** 0.009* 
 Current   -0.046** 0.002  -0.046** 0.001 
 Future   0.001 -0.002  0.003 -0.003* 
        
GROWTH Past   0.056** -0.021**  0.058** -0.021** 
 Current   0.084** -0.041**  0.086** -0.042** 
 Future   -0.003 0.009*  -0.003 0.004* 
        
TRANSIENT  Past   0.046** -0.016**  0.048** -0.016** 
 Current   0.069** -0.028**  0.073** -0.030** 
 Future   -0.001 0.003  -0.002 0.002 
        
LARGE Past   0.008* -0.004  0.008** -0.004 
 Current   0.032** -0.025**  0.034** -0.026** 
 Future   -0.001 0.003  0.001 0.000 
        
BLOCK Past   -0.042** 0.009  -0.042** 0.010 
 Current   -0.052** 0.041**  -0.053** 0.043** 
 Future   0.009 -0.009  0.009** -0.006 
        
BET Past   -0.034** -0.010  -0.034** -0.008 
 Current   -0.057** -0.004  -0.056** -0.003 
 Future   0.000 0.007  0.005* -0.001 
        
INDEXP Past   -0.005 0.001  -0.005 0.001 
 Current   -0.012** 0.009*  -0.012** 0.009* 
 Future   0.000 -0.002  -0.002 0.001 
*, ** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, using a two tailed test. 
 
This table reports the summary of the results from Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) regressions where the 
dependent variable is the change in ownership for an individual institution and the independent variables include 
private information proxies and the interaction of these proxies with past, current, and future performance measures.  
These variables are further interacted with an indicator for whether the institution has a long-term position in the 
firm; i.e., held continuously for four quarters or more (LTHELD =1), or a relatively new position (LTHELD =0).  
We report the average regression coefficient from quarterly regressions with significance tests based on Fama-
MacBeth t-statistics.  There are 79, 87, 87, and 84 quarterly regressions for AFE, CAR, BHAR3, and BHAR12, 
respectively.  All coefficients are multiplied by 100.  All dependent and independent variables are mean centered at 
the firm-quarter level to remove fixed effects.  Intercepts and main effects for all private information proxies are 
estimated, but not reported.  The column labels indicate the definition of performance measure for a given regression 
and the interaction with the LTHELD indicator.  All variable definitions are given in panel A of the Appendix. 
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